ÐÏà¡±á>þÿ vxþÿÿÿuÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿì¥ÁU ðR¿\bjbjënën2d‰éa‰éaã: ÿÿÿÿÿÿ·""ÿÿÿÿÁÁÁ8ù\UÁœNlqqqqq¥¥¥÷MùMùMùMùMùMùM$P¶¾R<�N9¥¥¥¥¥Nqq4VN999¥qq÷M9¥÷M999qÿÿÿÿ¤“¯JœÖÿÿÿÿÃ(9ãMlN0œN9úRëFúR99¶/úRïJô¥¥9¥¥¥¥¥NN1¥¥¥œN¥¥¥¥ÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿúR¥¥¥¥¥¥¥¥¥"Qs: Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory Volume 30, Issue 4, October 2020 1. Title: Whoever Has Will be Given More: The Effect of Performance Information on Frontline Employees’ Support for Managerial Policy Initiatives Authors: Niels Bjørn G Petersen Abstract: Research has demonstrated how policy changes are bound to fail without the support of frontline employees. This study examines how performance information influences frontline employees’ support for managerial policy initiatives. We develop hypotheses stating that the exposure to positive and negative organizational performance scores compared to average scores increases frontline employees’ support for managerial policy initiatives and thus facilitate policy change. To test our hypotheses, we conduct a survey experiment on more than 1,500 social caseworkers working in Danish employment agencies. The results show that while the provision of positive organizational scores increases caseworkers’ support for managerial policy initiatives, there is no direct effect following the exposure of negative performance scores. However, additional exploratory analysis reveals that the caseworkers’ experienced work pressure moderates the effect of positive and negative performance information. Specifically, caseworkers that experience a high work pressure are more inclined to support managerial policy initiatives following positive and negative performance scores. Furthermore, the explorative analysis indicates that the caseworkers tend to ignore negative performance information, which strongly suggests that poor performance scores trigger identity-protective cognition. Overall, the study advances our understanding of the link between performance information and support of policy changes on the frontline of public services by showing how different performance scores influence employees’ support for managerial policy initiatives. 2. Title: Hidden Politics? Assessing Lobbying Success During US Agency Guidance Development Authors: Susan Webb Yackee Abstract: I test the proposition that interest groups achieve greater policy success when they lobby during the agency guidance document development process as opposed to the notice and comment process. Policymaking via guidance documents often receives lower levels of public attention, which provides greater flexibility to accommodate lobbying requests. I analyze the hypothesis during the creation of 41 rules by one US government agency—20 of which were promulgated using the notice and comment process and 21 via the guidance document process. I measure regulatory policy change using a content analysis of government documents and lobbying texts, and I also incorporate a telephone survey of interest groups who lobbied on these same rules. I find that interest groups perceive—and achieve—greater policy success when lobbying during the agency guidance process. The results yield new insights into the relationship between lobbying and regulatory policymaking. 3. Title: Positivity and Negativity Dominance in Citizen Assessments of Intergovernmental Sustainability Performance Authors: Aaron Deslatte Abstract: Understanding how the public assesses the performance of complex, intergovernmental efforts such as sustainability is critical for understanding both managerial decision-making and institutional design. Drawing from the performance and federalism literature, this study investigates the role that distinctive elements of negativity bias play in citizen assessments of intergovernmental performance. In three survey experiments, this study exploits a well-known intergovernmental initiative to explore the effects of episodic performance information on citizen support for varying sustainability-related activities. Two inter-related research questions are addressed. First, does the positive or negative valence of citizen performance assessments vary with the type and scope of activity? Second, does positive or negative performance information tend to dominate in more realistic scenarios in which both types of stimuli interact? The results advance theoretical understanding of public performance with evidence that the type of activity can influence citizen assessments both positively and negatively. Additionally, partisan cues can overwhelm otherwise positive views of performance in some contexts, a concept described in the psychology literature as negativity dominance. The findings add important insights by showing that biased reasoning of citizens is not just a blanket affective association with constant treatment effects across any type of governmental effort, but is contingent on both the activity and political context. 4. Title: Public Capacity, Plural Forms of Collaboration, and the Performance of Public Initiatives: A Configurational Approach Authors: Sergio G Lazzarini, Leandro S Pongeluppe, Nobuiuki C Ito, Felippe de Medeiros Oliveira, Armen Ovanessoff. Abstract: We assess conditions that explain plural forms of public and private action using a comparative study of 24 public initiatives in Brazil, India, and South Africa. Measuring performance as evidence of positive outcomes to their target populations, we compare cases of high and low performance. Our configurational approach examines combinations of conditions leading to positive outcomes: public operational capacity, diverse collaborations nurtured by public units (with for-profit firms, with nonprofit organizations, and with other units in the public bureaucracy), and stakeholder orientation (permeability to multiple sources of input to design and adjust the project). We apply fuzzy set qualitative comparative analysis to unveil configurations consistent with high performance. Our configurational analysis reveals two distinct paths to high performance. A path with higher private engagement involves concurrent collaborations with for-profit and nonprofit actors, whereas an alternative path with higher internal (public) engagement relies on collaborations within the public bureaucracy complemented by high permeability to inputs from multiple stakeholders. Our results also confirm that strong public capacity is necessary in all high-performance configurations. An important implication is that externalization and multiple forms of collaboration are not substitutes for weak governments. Furthermore, our configurational perspective contributes to the literature by operationalizing a multiple-actor, multiple-logic perspective describing alternative paths to high performance. 5. Title: Representative Bureaucracy and Public Hiring Preferences: Evidence from a Conjoint Experiment among German Municipal Civil Servants and Private Sector Employees Authors: Michael Jankowski, Christine Prokop, Markus Tepe. Abstract: Drawing on Weber, this study tests whether the normative principles of merit orientation and impartiality are more prevalent in shaping public hiring preferences among civil servants—both junior and senior—than among private sector employees. In a conjoint experiment, respondents are asked to compare two hypothetical applicants for an office job in a municipal administration and to decide which they would hire. The application profiles vary with respect to a set of meritocratic and nonmeritocratic attributes. The empirical findings suggest that first, in all three samples, hiring decisions are primarily based on meritocratic attributes. Second, there is evidence of ethnic discrimination in the private employee sample, while there is no such effect in either of the two civil servant samples. Third, private employees’ hiring preferences are influenced by personal political beliefs, while civil servants are less likely to let political attitudes affect their hiring choices. Thus, while civil servants hiring preferences are largely consistent with passive representation and nondiscrimination, support for a representative bureaucracy among citizens should be improved. 6. Title: The Benefits of PSM: An Oasis or a Mirage? Authors: Sahar Awan, Germà Bel, Marc Esteve. Abstract: Scholarly interest in public service motivation (PSM) has yielded a vast amount of research, exploring its potential for benefitting public-sector organizations through increased employee job satisfaction, enhanced individual performance, employee retention, and enhanced organizational commitment and citizenship behavior. However, a closer inspection of the literature reveals mixed empirical evidence for each impact of PSM. The present study carries out a meta-analysis of five key impacts of PSM to explain the divergence of results in the existing literature. We find evidence of the existence of a true effect for PSM over all the dependent variables, except for turnover intentions. In addition, we find a possible explanation for the mixed empirical evidence found in previous studies. We demonstrate that individual and organizational benefits of PSM are not accrued equally in all public sector workplaces and that the contextual variables legal origin and endemic countrywide corruption influence the extent to which PSM can produce positive outcomes in the workplace. 7. Title: Modeling Alternative Collaborative Governance Network Designs: An Agent-Based Model of Water Governance in the Lake Champlain Basin, Vermont Authors: Patrick Bitterman, Christopher J Koliba. Abstract: With the widespread use of collaborative governance mechanisms for mitigating water pollution, an opportunity exists to test alternative institutional designs based on collaborative governance theory using computer simulation models, particularly when there is a clear relationship between governance networks, observable resource allocation decisions, and measurable outcomes. This is especially the case for wicked problems like nonpoint source water pollution where there are compelling questions regarding how best to design policies, allocate funds, and build administrative capacity to meet water quality standards. We present an agent-based model (ABM) of water governance for the Lake Champlain Basin to simulate the impacts of alternative collaborative governance arrangements on the development of suites of water quality projects. The ABM is connected or coupled with land use and phosphorus load accumulation models that are informed by existing hydrologic models, project datasets, and state-set load reduction targets. We find that regionally arranged collaborative governance in water quality project planning and implementation can lead to better water quality outcomes, thereby affirming one of the central premises of collaborative governance regime theory. We also find that externally mandated collaboration, as opposed to voluntary, self-initiated collaboration, can lead to better water quality outcomes, adding to our understanding of which type of collaborative governance arrangement is best suited to the specific contexts of this case. Further, without adequate administrative capacity in the form of human resources located in central network actors to manage project funds, “administrative bottlenecks” may form and money can go unspent. This research demonstrates the efficacy of using simulations of alternative institutional design for theory testing and tuning, and policy prototyping. 8. Title: The Psychological Costs of Citizen Coproduction Authors: Mette Kjærgaard Thomsen, Martin Baekgaard, Ulrich Thy Jensen. Abstract: Coproduction where citizens collaborate with public employees in producing and delivering public services is often argued to be associated with benefits for either participating citizens, their relatives, friends, or society at large. Less is known about the potential downsides associated with citizen participation in coproduction of public services. We argue that psychological costs, such as experiences of stigma, stress, and loss of autonomy may arise among citizens in response to coproduction initiatives stimulated or directly imposed by public organizations. We test our propositions in two randomized vignette experiments on a representative sample of Danish citizens. First, we manipulate whether citizens are encouraged to coproduce public services yielding private or collective benefits. Second, we induce perceived self-efficacy among a subsample of citizens. We find that citizens are more likely to experience psychological costs when they are encouraged to coproduce public services resulting in private benefits for relatives or friends in contrast to collective benefits for a larger group of people. Furthermore, these psychological costs are felt to a greater extent among citizens with low self-efficacy. Fusing insights from multiple perspectives, our study pushes the theoretical frontiers of coproduction literature by illustrating how complex emotional responses is an overlooked, but integral part of a more comprehensive theory on the manifestations and effects of citizen coproduction. 9. Title: The Word on the Street or the Number from the State? Government-Provided Information and Americans Opinions of Schools é Authors: Jon Valant, Daniel A Newark. Abstract: Public institutions seeking to facilitate effective decision making by boundedly rational constituents often must determine what information to provide and in what form to provide it. Ideally, this determination would reflect an understanding of how different kinds, forms, and sources of information are processed by constituents and influence constituents’ beliefs. However, research on this topic—especially in the context of educational institutions, and with a focus on official numerical information versus electronic word of mouth—has been minimal. Considering the case of state governments wishing to inform citizens about their schools, we examine how parents and the US public evaluate schools after receiving two increasingly abundant kinds of school quality information: numerical government ratings and online parent comments. Using an online survey experiment with a nationally representative sample, we find that perceptions of school quality are heavily influenced by parent comments even when these comments appear alongside official ratings. By contrast, the effects of official numerical ratings appear modest. Additional findings suggest that the comments’ influence results from preferences for the information’s source (parents over government) and style (narrative over numerical), and that nonprofit organizations are more trusted messengers of performance information than state governments. These results advance our theoretical understanding of the effects of different kinds of information on belief, and we conclude the article by discussing their implications for how public institutions disseminate information to their constituents. 45<=>FGIPSUVWYbéíÜÊ¹ªÊªÊ˜‰zf^QC5hðhð5OJQJ^JhÌ"èhU<¬5OJQJ^Jh·uD5OJQJ^Jo(hÌ"èhÌ"èo(&hÌ"èhÌ"è5CJOJQJ^JaJo(h3`5CJOJQJ^JaJh 2e5CJOJQJ^JaJ#hðhð5CJOJQJ^JaJhð5CJOJQJ^JaJ hð5CJOJQJ^JaJo(#hÌ"èhÌ"è5CJOJQJ^JaJ h$-Ó5CJOJQJ^JaJo(#hðhð5CJOJQJ^JaJ5VWXê €ÞûÅÆ<Vefç\Ÿ! !L"‰"2'÷÷òííèããÞÞÞãÙÙÙãÔÔÔÏÊÊÏgdÐpsgd)w¤gd$?ÃgdToŸgdßl$gd%j,gdðgdU<¬gdÌ"è$a$gdt4éêòó ~€‚„Š‹ÜÝÞæçóåÚÌ¼åµ¨šŒtåf_QtAf:h2¾h2¾hvI¼hßl$5OJQJ^Jo(h%’h%’5OJQJ^Jh%’h%’hßl$hßl$5OJQJ^Jhßl$5OJQJ^Jo(hjŒ5OJQJo(hiht4OJQJ^Jo(hihjŒOJQJ^Jo(hðhðOJQJ^Jhðhðhðht45OJQJ^Jo(hðhð5OJQJ^Jhicy5OJQJ^JhÌ"èhU<¬5OJQJ^JhjŒ5OJQJ^Jo(çùúûÃÄÅÆÇÈÉÏÐ:;<DETUV_`cñäÔÆ¿²¤–‹~pi[¿ñ~K[¿ñ~K[¿²hvI¼hToŸ5OJQJ^Jo(hToŸhToŸ5OJQJ^JhToŸhToŸhÌ"èhÒ`Œ5OJQJ^JhToŸ5OJQJ^Jo(h%j,5OJQJo(hihU<¬OJQJ^Jo(h2¾hßl$OJQJ^Jo(h2¾h2¾OJQJ^Jh2¾h2¾hßl$hßl$5OJQJ^JhvI¼hßl$5OJQJ^Jo(hßl$5OJQJ^Jo(h2¾h2¾5OJQJ^JcdefgiopåæçïðXYZ[\ef!ž!Ÿ! !ñäÙÌ¾°©›Ž~°©›s›Ž~°©fXJ?h)w¤5OJQJo(h2¾h%j,OJQJ^Jo(h2¾h$?ÃOJQJ^Jo(h2¾h2¾OJQJ^Jh4x5OJQJ^JhvI¼h$?Ã5OJQJ^Jo(h$?Ã5OJQJ^Jo(h2¾h2¾5OJQJ^Jh2¾h2¾h$?Ãh$?Ã5OJQJ^JhÌ"èh%j,5OJQJ^Jhs/Ê5OJQJ^Jo(h%j,5OJQJo(h2¾haNOJQJ^Jh2¾hToŸOJQJ^Jo( !¡!£!©!ª!J"K"L"T"U"…"†"‡"ˆ"‰"’"“"0'1'2'3'4'6'<'óå×ÐÂó´×ÐÂ©Âó™‹Ð~pbWJå<�hr7Ahr7A5OJQJ^Jhr7A5OJQJ^Jo(h)w¤5OJQJo(hvI¼h)w¤OJQJ^Jo(h}Onh)w¤OJQJ^Jo(h2¾h2¾OJQJ^Jh$?Ãh)w¤5OJQJ^JhvI¼h)w¤5OJQJ^Jo(h4x5OJQJ^JhvI¼hÐps5OJQJ^Jh2¾h2¾5OJQJ^Jh2¾h2¾hÐpshÐps5OJQJ^JhÌ"èh)w¤5OJQJ^JhÐps5OJQJ^Jo(2'3'i'˜'Ü+Ý+t,¨,2434n4·4¯:°:6<�†<�ÏCÐCZZÖZ[î[ò[ô[ø[úõõúúððúúëëúúææúúáúÜÜáúú×gd°gdÿ_gdËoõgdLz¥gd)ggd|ÿgdr7Agd)w¤<'='g'h'i'q'r'”'•'–'—'˜'¡'¢'Ú+Û+Ü+Ý+Þ+à+ùëÞÐÂùë·ë©™‹ù~pbWJ<�hÌ"èh)w¤5OJQJ^Jh|ÿ5OJQJ^Jo(h)w¤5OJQJo(hvI¼h)w¤OJQJ^Jo(hº.h)w¤OJQJ^Jo(hº.hº.OJQJ^Jh$?Ãh)w¤5OJQJ^JhvI¼h)w¤5OJQJ^Jo(hvI¼hvI¼5OJQJ^Jh4x5OJQJ^Jhr7Ahr7A5OJQJ^JhvI¼hr7A5OJQJ^Jhr7A5OJQJ^Jo(hº.hº.5OJQJ^Jhº.hº.à+æ+ç+s,t,|,},¤,¥,¦,§,¨,±,²,041424344464<4ñäÖÈñÁÖ¶Öñ¦˜Á‹}odWI;h)gh)g5OJQJ^JhÌ"èh)w¤5OJQJ^Jh)g5OJQJ^Jo(h)w¤5OJQJo(hvI¼h)w¤OJQJ^Jo(h}Onh)w¤OJQJ^Jo(hº.hº.OJQJ^Jh$?Ãh)w¤5OJQJ^JhvI¼h)w¤5OJQJ^Jo(h4x5OJQJ^Jhº.hº.hvI¼h|ÿ5OJQJ^Jhº.hº.5OJQJ^Jh|ÿ5OJQJ^Jo(h|ÿh|ÿ5OJQJ^J<4=4l4m4n4v4w4³4´4µ4¶4·4À4Á4:¯:°:±:³:¹:º:ùëÞÐÂùë·ëÞ§™ùŒ~sfXJ=hLz¥5OJQJ^Jo(hLz¥hLz¥5OJQJ^JhÌ"èh)w¤5OJQJ^JhR5OJQJ^Jo(h)w¤5OJQJo(hM h)w¤OJQJ^Jo(hM hM OJQJ^Jh$?Ãh)w¤5OJQJ^JhvI¼h)w¤5OJQJ^Jo(h4x5OJQJ^Jh)gh)g5OJQJ^JhvI¼h)g5OJQJ^Jh)g5OJQJ^Jo(hM hM 5OJQJ^JhM hM º:4<�6<�F<�H<�~<�€<�‚<�„<�†<�˜<�š<�ÍCÎCÏCDZZZZ$ZñãÕÎñÃñÕ³¥Î˜Š|sqfYK=hÿ_hÿ_5OJQJ^JhÌ"èh)w¤5OJQJ^JhR5OJQJ^Jo(hËoõ5OJQJo(Uh)w¤5OJQJhvI¼h)w¤OJQJ^Jo(hê Vh)w¤OJQJ^Jo(hê Vhê VOJQJ^Jh$?Ãh)w¤5OJQJ^JhvI¼h)w¤5OJQJ^Jo(h4x5OJQJ^Jhê Vhê VhLz¥hLz¥5OJQJ^JhvI¼hLz¥5OJQJ^Jhê Vhê V5OJQJ^JåNN/ffNÄ‹ÿ 10. Title: Can Managers Get it Right? Examining the Crossroads of Accountability and Measurement Authors: Kate Albrecht Abstract: The article reviews the book Performance Measurement for Managing Local Government by David N. 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